Using detailed data originating from several hundred households of the German Residential Energy Survey (GRECS), this paper empirically investigates the returns on investment in home-equipped photovoltaics (PV) installations. We fi nd that these returns were particularly high in the years 2009 to 2011, when large subsidies for solar electricity coincided with plummeting module prices. While our empirical analysis demonstrates that such investments also incur substantial risks, there is evidence that, above all, wealthy households tend to benefi t from the solar subsidies, whereas the costs of fi nancing these subsidies are borne by electricity consumers at large, not least poverty-endangered households. The resulting redistribution of fi nancial resources raises the question of whether the burden-sharing of Germany's transition to an alternative energy system is fair. JEL Classifi cation: Q28, Q42, Q48
Introduction
Germany's transition to an alternative energy system is mainly characterized by the promotion of renewable energy technologies and the phase-out of nuclear power by the end of 2022. This transition will inevitably lead to further increasing electricity prices (Frondel, Sommer, Vance, 2015) and bodes poorly for many low-income households. Power prices for German households have already doubled since the introduction of the feed-in-tariff (FIT) promotion scheme for renewable energy sources (RES) in 2000.
This promotion scheme, which is legally codified under the Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG), has established itself as a global role model. FITs have been adopted by a wide range of countries throughout the world, even by countries with a high endowment of sun such as Australia (Nelson, Simshauser, Kelley, 2011; Nelson, Simshauser, Nelson, 2012) .
Among the countries of the European Union, FITs have become the most popular promotion scheme for RES (CEER, 2013) .
Under the EEG legislation, utilities are obliged to pay technology-specific feed-in tariffs far above own production costs to those who produce green electricity using alternative technologies, such as solar and wind power plants. Ultimately, though, it is the industrial and private consumers who have to bear the costs induced by the promotion of renewable energy technologies through a surcharge on the price of electricity (Frondel et al., 2010) . Between 2009 and this surcharge almost quintupled, rising from 1.31 euro cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) to 6.17 ct/kWh (Figure 1) .
A key reason for this strong increase was the massive installation of photovoltaic (PV) capacities in recent years: At the end of 2014, total PV capacities exceeded 38 Gigawatt (GW), an amount that was more than six times higher than the 6 GW that had been installed until 2008 (BMWi, 2014a, Table 1 ). This is a consequence of the so-called solar boom in Germany, which primarily occurred in 5 the years 2010 to 2012 (Table 1) , when the newly installed capacities exceeded 7 GW each year. annual surpluses of about one billion euros. More than half of these surpluses are garnered by households originating from the top three deciles of the income distribution (BARDT, NIEHUES, 2013: 217) . Moreover, it is suspected that this redistribution from rather poor to more wealthy households that own PV modules goes along with returns that are much larger than those of comparable investments. 
7
To provide for an empirical basis for this speculation, this article estimates a bandwidth for the returns on investment in PV modules, employing detailed data originating from the German Residential Energy Survey (GRECS) for the years 2007-2013. Based on the annual solar electricity yields and the PV capacities installed by several hundred households, we find that these returns were particularly high in the years 2009 to 2011, when large subsidies for solar electricity coincided with plummeting module prices. We also present evidence showing that income and wealth are significant correlates of PV installations.
The following section describes the data basis and the basic assumptions underlying our calculations. Section 3 presents our estimates of the returns, followed by a sensitivity analysis set out in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes econometrically the household-level correlates of PV installations. The last section summarizes and concludes.
Data and Basic Assumptions
Our empirical analysis draws on the data of three waves of the German Residential Energy Survey (GRECS) for the years 2006-2008, 2009-2010, and 2011-2013 . The number of households that participated in the surveys amounted to 6,714, 7,125 and 8,561, respectively (RWI, forsa, 2011 6,714, 7,125 and 8,561, respectively (RWI, forsa, , 2013 6,714, 7,125 and 8,561, respectively (RWI, forsa, , 2015 . These surveys gathered energy-related information from participants, including the availability of PV installations and other alternative energy technologies at the households' residence.
In total, 563 households indicated that they own PV modules. 1 About one fourth of them are among the high-income households, disposing of a monthly net income of more than 4,200 euros, whereas 8.2% of these households state that their net income is lower than 1,700 euros. These figures support the assumption that PV modules are more common in high-income households. This assumption, which we verify below with a probit model, is confirmed by the fact that 90 % of those households with PV installations are owners of their residence.
Of the 563 households with PV modules, only 294 provided all the information that is required for calculating returns on investment, most notably the year of PV installation, the capacity in kilowatts (kW), as well as the individual solar electricity yield in 2013. 2 Both the information on the year of installation and the capacity determine the individual feed-in tariff (FIT) in euros per kWh that a household receives for producing solar electricity and feeding it into the public grid. By multiplying the individual FIT with the annual solar electricity yield in 2013, the annual revenues from PV installations can be calculated.
To estimate the revenues not just for 2013, but for all those years since a household installed PV modules at home, we estimate the unknown solar electricity yields for the year t prior to 2013 by modulating the yields of 2013 on the basis of data on state-specific sunshine hours. In detail, the unknown solar electricity yield for the year t is calculated using the following equation:
Solar electricity yield in t = Electricity yield in 2013 * # Sunshine hours in t /# Sunshine hours in 2013,
where the number (#) of annual sunshine hours for each of the 16 German federal states is provided by Deutscher Wetterdienst (DWD, 2015) . This calculation is based on the assumption that the number of sunshine hours is the dominant determinant of a PV module's solar electricity yield, an assumption that appears to be warranted, as other factors, such as maintenance periods, are of minor importance (BARDT, NIEHUES 2013: 216).
Estimating the annual profits requires subtracting maintenance costs, annual depreciation, and other costs from total revenues. To this end, for the base model we assume a linear depreciation rate over the period of 20 years during which it is legally ensured that households receive subsidies in the form of solar FITs. Annual maintenance costs are assumed to account for 1% of total installation costs (ACKER, 2015a; FINKE, 2015a; MADEL, 2015) . Not included in the base 9 model are insurance costs and the opportunity to finance the investment by loans, both of which are taken into account in our sensitivity analysis. Instead, the base model assumes that households had financed their PV investments entirely with their own money when calculating the return estimates presented in the following section.
As we have no information on the individual acquisition costs, we have estimated each household's investment amount on the basis a price index for readyto-use PV installations (ZIEGLER, 2015) . In our sensitivity analysis, we have varied this price information to account for the possibility that households may have paid substantially different prices than indicated by this price index.
In determining the individual return on investment, it bears noting that the invested capital is not bound over the entire service life of the PV installation. This is because in each year operating revenues are generated that can be reinvested. We therefore invoke the simplifying assumption that, on average, the bound capital amounts to half of the acquisition costs over the life service of the module (see WÖHE, DÖRING 2008: 529) . Accordingly, our calculation of the returns divides the yearly profits by half of the one-time acquisition costs, I:
( 2 ) where denotes the solar electricity fed into the grid in year t, is the guaranteed feed-in tariff, the annual depreciation, and are the annual operating costs.
Return on Investment Estimates
As is evident from (Table 3) .
Similarly large discrepancies across the years of installation can be observed for the annual surpluses: with an average of 306 euros per year and installation, the surpluses are lowest for those modules that were installed in 2012. In contrast, the highest mean surplus of 1,210 euros per annum results for the installation year 2010. This outcome is virtually identical to the surplus estimated by BARDT and NIEHUES (2013: 217) for the same year on the basis of theoretical assumptions, rather than empirical evidence. These authors reckon that for modules with a capacity of 10 kW that were installed in 2010, the monthly surplus amounts to 100 euros. Naturally, the return on investment varies with the sunshine hours per
year. Per assumption, this is the sole factor that explains the differences in the return estimates presented in Table 3 . To compare the returns on investment in PV installations with the returns of alternative investments, two distinct interest rates are reported in Table 3 : that of the EURIBOR (Euro Interbank Offered Rate) with a maturity period of 12 months (DEUTSCHE BUNDESBANK 2015a, b) and the interest rate of a German government bond with a maturity period of 20 years, which corresponds to the period during which FIT payments for solar electricity generation are guaranteed. Table 3 reports the annual means of the monthly published interest rates of both these investment alternatives.
It turns out that for 2008 the average return of 7.18% on PV modules that were installed in 2007 is substantially larger than the interest rates reported in Table 2 for the same year. This spread grew notably in the aftermath of the global finance and debt crisis that emerged at the end of the last decade. The strong increase in the relative profitability of PV installations after 2008 also becomes apparent from the comparison of the evolution of installation costs and FITs ( Figure   2 ). Most notably, average installation costs shrank much more in the years 2009 to 2011 than the FIT level, leading to particularly large returns for those modules that were installed in these years (BARDT, NIEHUES 2013: 216). 
Sensitivity Analysis
We now investigate the robustness of our return estimates presented in the previous section. To this end, we alter several of the assumptions set out in Section 2.
For example, in addition to maintenance costs, we now also subtract insurance costs from the annual revenues.
Insurance Costs
Given potential damage due to storms, fire and hail, corresponding risk insurance is available. In addition to the compensation of module damages, such insurance typically also compensates for forgone FIT revenues (MEYER, 2015) . Commonly, the annual premium for such insurance amounts to about 0.3-0.8% of total acquisition costs (FINKE, 2015b) . Along with operating costs and depreciation, the yearly insurance premium is subtracted from the FIT revenues when calculating the returns presented in Figure 3 . While the resulting decreases in returns highlight the appreciable impact of insurance on the investment decision, the average returns on PV units installed between 2009 and 2011 nevertheless remain in the double-digit percentage point range. 
Acquisition Costs
As the survey did not include information on individual acquisition costs, these were estimated with the aid of a price index for ready-to-use installations. Recognizing that the actual investment costs are likely to deviate from this reference line, we allow for variation in the acquisition costs ranging between -20% to +20%. The corresponding range in the estimated returns for modules installed in . The effect of these additional costs can therefore be seen from the curve in Figure 4 showing the returns corresponding to 10% higher acquisition costs than is assumed in the base model.
Service Life of PV Installations
In the absence of comprehensive historical values, it is typically assumed that PV installations have a service life of at least 20 years. PV manufacturers correspondingly offer guarantees that span over 25 years (ACKER, 2015c) . Some sources cite service lives that even stretch to 30 or 40 years (ELSNER, 2012) . This would increase the attainable returns beyond that suggested in the previous section by allowing for the own-use of solar electricity following the expiration of support from the EEG. The possibility of a shortened service life, however, should also be considered. To compare these alternatives, Figure 5 
Debt Financing
The base model assumes that households finance 100% of the acquisition costs with their own funds. A majority of PV installations, however, are financed with borrowed capital, as occurs when seed money is not available or when attractive terms on borrowing are offered that increase returns. In past years, one such source for favorable credit was the KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), which financed a large share of PV investments ( Figure 6 ). By 2012, the share of KfWfinanced PV installations in Germany had climbed rapidly to reach 50.7%.
The important role of the KfW in this context suggests further exploration of the so-called "Credit 274" program, through which the KfW specifically targeted PV installations. This should serve as a good reference point for investments of this kind. Because only the currently prevailing effective interest rate is posted on the KfW internet site, we undertake the following sensitivity analysis by estimating rates for 2007 to 2012 by assuming a constant differential between the KfW rate and the EURIBOR. This differential is calculated using the EURIBOR and the KfW effective interest rate for May 2015 as the reference point. Figure 6 : KfW Share of Investments in PV Installations in Germany Source: Own calculations with data from ZSW (2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008) Investments in PV installations are typically not financed entirely through loans. According to figures from the KfW, the debt-financed share varies by 80% (see also ISE, 2013: 11) . This is confirmed by the figures in Table 4 , which shows the debt-share of financing to vary between 70 and 80% for the years 2007 through 2012. Source: Own calculations with data from ZSW (2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009, 2008) Debt financing of an investment can result in a leverage effect for the return on equity, r EK, when the investment return r exceeds the interest rate on the debt, r FK (WÖHE, DÖRING 2008: 661):
where V is the debt to equity ratio: V = FK/EK. Favorable interest rates on debt accordingly improve the return on equity of an investment.
Whether interest rates are favorable depends heavily on the creditworthiness of a household, with higher rates corresponding to lower creditworthiness. This is seen from the rates of 1.35 %, 3.15 % and 7.75 % charged by KfW to households having a creditworthiness classification of good, average, and poor, respectively. Due to a lack of credit history information of households, we maintain this three-tiered classification in the comparison that follows.
The results presented in Figures 7, 8, and 9 indicate that for the installation years from 2009 to 2011, returns on equity of 30% and more could be achieved.
Given a debt ratio of 80% and a good credit rating of the household, a 50% return on equity was even possible. As Figure 8 shows, households with an average creditworthy classification could also secure returns on equity well above those calculated in the base model. Poor creditworthiness is likely to be rare among households investing in PV installations. Nevertheless, a closer look at this circumstance in Figure 8 reveals that such investments do carry risks, in some instances leading to negative returns on equity for households having a poor credit history. Overall, these comparisons further confirm stark differences in returns according to the year the PV installation is brought into service. While the returns on equity were as high as 20% over the years from 2009 to 2011, they dipped into negative territory for poor creditworthy households and installations in the years 2007, 2008, and 2012 .
Correlates of PV Installation
Having demonstrated the potentially high returns from an investment in PV installations underwritten by Germany's EEG, we now briefly turn to examine the characteristics of those households undertaking the investment. To this end, we estimate a probit model that relates the binary outcome of PV ownership to a suite of explanatory variables measuring household-level socio-economic attributes.
These include dummy variables for various monthly income levels, 3 a continuous measure of the age of the household head, and dummies indicating different household size categories, whether the home is privately owned, whether it is a free-standing single-or two-family home, and its location in the country. Not surprisingly, the probability of PV ownership is highest in the south of Germany, roughly 10 percentage points higher than in the north, where the sun intensity is lower. Demographic factors also matter: each year of increase in the age of the household head lowers the probability by 0.1 percentage points, while larger household sizes increase the probability. A household having a size of 5 or more persons, for example, has a probability of owning a PV installation that is 7 percentage points higher than a single-person household. (Frondel et al., 2010) , a fundamental question regarding its distributive impacts arises (Frondel, Sommer, Vance, 2015) .
This question assumes increasing urgency with the growing role of solar electricity for own-use in driving the expansion of PV installations in Germany.
Operators of smaller installations having a capacity of up to 10 kilowatts (kW), as is usually the case for private households, are not required under the current legislation to pay electricity taxes, levies, and other charges, such as network charges and the levy for promoting renewable power technologies, for electricity they generate and use themselves, implying increases in the electricity bills of the remaining residential electricity consumers. This discordance between those generating the solar electricity and those bearing the costs of this generation could lead to a self-reinforcing cycle: As levies and the network charges continue to grow due to the increasing own-use of solar electricity, so too will the incentives to produce more electricity for own-use (Bardt et al., 2014:94) .
Further rising electricity prices coupled with lower prices for PV and complementary technologies, such as batteries for electricity storage, will only accelerate this process, especially as households realize opportunities for eventually becoming electricity-autarkic by exploiting storage capacities. Such a development would not only have negative distributional implications. It would also be questionable for efficiency reasons, not least because alternative technologies that do not lend themselves to own-use, such as wind power, would be disadvantaged.
Relative to a cost-minimizing outcome by the year 2025, Jägemann, Hagspiel and Lindenberger (2013:1) estimate the costs of the inefficiencies from 21 households that equip themselves with PV-and storage technologies to be 116 billion euros (in prices of 2011). The extent of these inefficiencies could be much stronger if companies from industry and from the trade, commerce and services sector take advantage of these opportunities. Solarboom 2.0 may thus become reality, with the attendant costs, inefficiencies, and inequities brought by the first boom. 
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